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ABSTRACT
Due to the recent increased interest in wireless mesh net-
works (WMN), their security challenges have become of pa-
ramount importance. An important security mechanism
for WMN, intrusion detection, has received considerable at-
tention from the research community. Recent results show
that traditional monitoring mechanisms are not applicable
to real-worldWMN due to their constrained resources (mem-
ory and processing power), which result in high false neg-
ative rates since only few IDS functions can be activated
on monitoring nodes. Cooperative solutions, on the other
hand, have high communication overhead and detection de-
lay when trac is high. A practical trac-aware IDS solu-
tion was recently proposed for resource-constrained WMN,
however, trac-awareness might not be feasible for some
WMN applications. This paper proposes a trac-agnostic
IDS solution that uses a link-coverage approach to monitor
both local and backbone WMN trac. Using real-world ex-
periments and extensive simulations we show our proposed
IDS solutions outperform trac-aware IDS solutions while
requiring lower computation and communication overhead.
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Mesh Networks (WMN) have emerged as a self-
managing and cost-eective broadband wireless networking
technology to provide Internet, Intranet, and other network-
ing services in large remote areas without networking infras-
tructures. WMN can also serve as a backbone communica-
tion infrastructure among mobile or xed clients, and hosts
(e.g., local le servers). Recently, the number of WMN de-
ployments has been increasing since they are suitable for
many applications such as disaster response [1{3], environ-
mental monitoring [4], rural IT services [5,6] and many oth-
ers [7].
As the interest in WMN increases, security issues, e.g., in-
trusion detection, become of paramount importance. Adopt-
ing traditional intrusion detection mechanisms from wired
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
Technical Report 2014, Texas A& M University
Copyright 2014 LENSS .
networks is not practical because: a) WMN lack single van-
tage points (e.g., gateways in wired networks) where network
trac can be inspected; b) WMN hardware has limited re-
sources (e.g., CPU and RAM) to run resource-demanding
intrusion detection systems (IDS). In light of these issues,
researchers have proposed distributed and resource-aware so-
lutions for network-wide intrusion detection in WMN. The
state-of-the-art distributed solutions for resource constrained
WMN can be categorized as: 1) monitoring node solutions;
2) cooperative IDS solutions; and 3) trac-aware IDS solu-
tions.
Monitoring node solutions [8{10] select a subset of nodes
(called monitoring nodes), assign each selected node the
same set of IDS functions for monitoring a distinct part
of network (i.e., either communication links [10] or WMN
nodes [9]). These solutions, however, suer from high false
negative rates because some IDS functions cannot be acti-
vated on monitoring nodes due to limited resources (e.g.,
memory and processing power). Recently, OpenLIDS [11],
proposed a Lightweight detection engine for WMN that im-
poses less computational load than o-the-shelf IDS. How-
ever, when compared to o-the-shelf IDS, OpenLIDS has
even higher false negative rates because fewer IDS functions
are implemented in the detection engine.
In Cooperative IDS solutions [12,13], resource-constrained
nodes are assigned a few distinct IDS functions for local in-
trusion detection and exchange information for cooperative
intrusion detection (i.e., to achieve higher detection rates).
Cooperative IDS thus have low false negative rates, how-
ever, they incur high detection delay and high communi-
cation overhead due to the message exchange required for
intrusion detection. Hence, considering the relatively high
trac rates in WMN, these solutions are not practical and
scalable for WMN.
Trac-aware IDS was recently proposed [14] as a practi-
cal intrusion detection mechanism for resource-constrained
WMN. These solutions use the knowledge that a security
administrator has about network trac to distribute IDS
functions only along routing paths. Considering the distinct
set of IDS functions on each node along a routing path, the
entire trac on that path is investigated by more IDS func-
tions while none of the nodes is overloaded. This mechanism,
unlike cooperative IDS, is non-cooperative, providing a real-
time detection mechanism, and has higher detection rates
than monitoring solutions [14]. However, trac-awareness
is sometimes a strong assumption for many WMN applica-
tions where routing paths change frequently.
The research presented in this article is motivated by the
fact that in many WMN applications trac paths change
very often, which consequently degrades the performance
of trac-aware IDS solutions. For example, routing paths
in large scale WMN that provide networking services for
mobile clients are subject to change due to client mobil-
ity. Additionally, WMN topology, especially in outdoor
deployments, may change due to node failures or drastic
link-quality changes. Hence, the trac knowledge has to
be very accurate and up-to-date in trac-aware solutions,
which is not always feasible. In this article, we propose a
trac-agnostic intrusion detection mechanism for resource-
constrained WMN that monitors all communication links,
instead of only few paths. Such an approach in WMN IDS
is trac-independent, but requires more mesh nodes to par-
ticipate in detection mechanism. Thus, trac-agnostic so-
lutions are more complex than trac-aware solutions since
all of WMN nodes must be considered in the optimal IDS
function distribution problem (as opposed to trac-aware
solutions that only consider few nodes on the routing paths).
Our proposed IDS mechanism is based on trac-agnostic
and link-coverage approaches inspired by the PRIDE [14]
and EEMON [10] intrusion detection systems. Our solu-
tion, irrespective to the changes in WMN trac paths, is
able to monitor the entire WMN trac, at the price, how-
ever, of putting IDS load on all WMN nodes instead of those
located only along routing paths. In our proposed solution,
each node, depending on its available resources, is assigned
a subset of IDS functions, i.e., a customized IDS congura-
tion, and investigates the entire network trac on the set
of communication links it can monitor (i.e., in its coverage
area). This customized IDS allows resource conservation
on resource-constrained WMN nodes and also increases the
probability of monitoring a WMN link with multiple dis-
tinct IDS functions activated on all WMN nodes that can
monitor the link. The decision of activating the optimal sub-
set of IDS functions on each node, to achieve the maximum
possible link coverage and consequently maximum detection
rates, is shown [14, 15] to be an optimization problem. It
is worth mentioning that for a given network size, the com-
plexity of trac-agnostic solution is larger than trac-aware
solution as it needs to nd optimal IDS function distribu-
tion for all nodes. Hence, our proposed solution has to be
fast and scalable. More precisely, the contributions of this
article are as follows:
 It demonstrates that distributing IDS functions among
WMN nodes increases the intrusion detection rate when
compared to state-of-the-art monitoring mechanisms.
 It proposes a trac-agnostic IDS solution for resource-
constrainedWMN based on a link-coverage mechanism
that monitors all WMN links instead of only routing
paths.
 It formulates a novel IDS Function distribution prob-
lem, called Link Coverage Problem (LCP), with the
objective to maximize the intrusion detection rate while
ensuring that nodes are not overloaded by IDS func-
tions.
 It proposes RAPID (Randomized APproach Intrusion
Detection), a protocol for solving LCP, and two cen-
tralized and distributed implementations of it. It also
provides an analysis of the two implementations to il-
lustrate the tradeo of time and communication over-
head for intrusion detection rate.
 It presents the performance of RAPID for intrusion
detection rates and compare it with state-of-the-art
solutions.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
state-of-the-art solutions for intrusion detection in resource-
constrained WMN and enumerates some scenarios that are
not considered in those solutions. Section 3 presents the sys-
tem and security models considered in this article. Prelim-
inaries and problem formulation are presented in Section 4.
Section 5 presents the RAPID protocol and two implemen-
tations for it. We present the performance of our proposed
IDS solution in Section 6 and conclude the article in Sec-
tion 7.
2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
In this section, we rst review state-of-the-art IDS solu-
tions proposed for WMN and identify challenges they face,
making them impractical for WMN. Next, we present our in-
spiring IDS solution, PRIDE [14], and describe a motivating
scenario that highlights PRIDE's limitations in highly dy-
namic WMN. Finally, we present lessons learned from state-
of-the-art solutions that helped the design of our proposed
IDS.
2.1 State of the Art
The problem of intrusion detection in wireless mesh net-
works has received some attention from the research commu-
nity. Some existing solutions address specic attacks (e.g.,
Man-in-the-Middle and Wormhole Attacks [16], Grayhole
attack [17], message fabrication attack [13], and schedul-
ing in WMN [18]). Other solutions are general IDS solu-
tions for mesh networks, which consider memory, process-
ing [11, 14, 19], and energy [10] constraints for performing
o-the-shelf IDS tools on WMN devices. The later group
of IDS solutions aim at addressing the challenges associ-
ated with monitoring mechanisms for intrusion detection in
WMN, as opposed to the former group which addresses spe-
cic attacks in such networks. In this article, we do not
propose a detection rule/mechanism for a specic attack.
Instead, we investigate the problem of monitoring WMN
trac using o-the-shelf IDS that can detect both known
and stealth attacks [20,21].
Due to the infrastructureless nature of WMN, researchers,
inspired by early research in ad hoc networks [22{25], have
proposed distributed solutions for intrusion detection sys-
tems in WMN [9, 26{28]. In early research, mainly in the
context of sensor networks and MANET, an intrusion de-
tection agent was placed on each ad hoc node (completely
decentralized) [22]. This approach is inecient primarily
because of redundant monitoring on multi-hop trac that
causes unnecessary resource consumption (e.g., resources that
can be allocated to other networking services). The afore-
mentioned ineciency triggered major research on optimal
monitoring for intrusion detection systems [8{10,23{25]. In
optimal monitoring solutions, a minimum subset of nodes
is selected to perform IDS functions and monitor the entire
network trac. However, since the number of IDS functions
on each node is limited by the amount of resources available
to it, these solutions can only detect a limited number of at-
tacks. In order to address the challenges posed by optimal
monitoring solutions, i.e., high false negative rates due to
performing few IDS functions, some researchers have pro-
posed lightweight IDS for resource-constrained WMN de-
vices [11, 13, 29]. These solutions, however, still employ
attack-specic detection engines because they implement few
IDS functions, resulting in high false negative detection rates.
As an alternative, to achieve high detection rates while
conserving resources on resource-constrained WMN nodes,
cooperative IDS solutions [12,13] have been proposed. In co-
operative IDS solutions (e.g., hierarchical [12,30{32], group-
based [33{35], zone-based [36], or neighbor-assisted [37,38])
every node is assigned a few IDS functions to detect attacks
based on local observation. A cooperative IDS engine is then
employed for detecting more attacks, based on neighbor in-
formation [13,38]. Cooperative mechanisms incur high com-
munication overhead, caused by message exchange required
for intrusion detection, and high detection latency [39], since
some of decisions are made only after receiving other nodes'
reports. Therefore, although cooperative IDS have proven
viable for low-trac networks, e.g., sensor networks, they
are not practical (i.e., degrades the network performance
and delays intrusion response) in WMN with signicant traf-
c [6, 7, 27,40,41].
Recently, two trac-aware IDS solutions, TRAM [26] and
PRIDE [14,27], have been proposed for trac monitoring of
WMN routing paths. TRAM shows how to use mesh nodes
in a multi-channel WMN to monitor network trac while
also contributing in WMN routing process. The proposed
solution, however, does not specify the IDS tools and de-
tection engine used in intrusion monitoring and the actual
computational load imposed to WMN nodes. PRIDE pro-
poses to use the security administrator's knowledge about
WMN trac to distribute IDS functions (i.e., Snort detec-
tion rules) to the nodes along WMN routing paths. Each
node in a trac path is assigned a distinct set of IDS func-
tions such that the network trac on that path is investi-
gated by maximum, if not all, possible IDS functions in real-
time (no detection latency caused by node cooperation). It is
shown [14,27] that such a trac-aware solution has a higher
detection rate than optimal monitoring solutions when ap-
plied to real-world resource-constrained WMN.
2.2 Motivation
This research is motivated by the fact that, although PRIDE
was shown [14,27] to be a practical intrusion detection mech-
anism for resource constrained WMN, it is based on a strong
assumption about WMN trac. In this section, we inves-
tigate some of the challenges that PRIDE faces in some
real-world WMN applications. Additionally, we show some
features that, if added to PRIDE, can signicantly improve
its performance.
2.2.1 Challenges
PRIDE considers static resource-constrained WMN where
network topology does not change often (compared to other
ad hoc networks). It assumes that network information peri-
odically collected by the base station reects the most recent
network topology. However, research has shown [3, 42, 43]
that even static WMN topology and routing paths are sub-
ject to change due to: a) link-quality variations caused by
weather, noise and other radio signals, etc.; b) mobility of
clients and their requested services that result in changes of
WMN routing paths; c) node failure (e.g., running out of
power) or node replacement (e.g., administrative reasons)
during network lifetime. Hence, trac awareness might be a
strong assumption for many WMN applications. Motivated
by this fact, we propose a trac-agnostic IDS solution.
PRIDE is not a scalable solution because its execution
time (i.e., to nd optimal IDS function distribution for WMN
nodes) signicantly increases when network size, number
of paths, and number of IDS functions increase, or when
the memory threshold on the nodes decreases. The results
shown in [14] are for a 10-node WMN for only 2 paths (for
each given path length). When applied to a larger network
(e.g., 30 nodes and 15 paths), however, it takes more than an
hour to obtain the optimal IDS function distribution. Thus,
a practical IDS solution must be able to quickly produce op-
timal results when used for large scale WMN. We note here
that the trac-agnostic solution, proposed here, has to solve
a more complex problem because all WMN nodes perform
IDS operations. Therefore, we need to develop an algorithm
that can produce optimal IDS function distribution for a
large WMN in a short period of time.
2.2.2 Improving Features
PRIDE only considers multi-hop attacks which means the
attack trac (malicious packets(s)) is routed across multiple
nodes (i.e., at least one WMN backbone link). In addition,
the experimental results [14] show that the longer the path
is, the higher the detection rate will be. We aim to design
an IDS that can detect both single-hop attacks (i.e., both
attacker and target are clients connected to same router)
and multi-hop attacks, routed through short paths (e.g., 2
hops).
PRIDE proposes a centralized algorithm that requires pe-
riodic data collection from WMN nodes and a computa-
tionally powerful base station to produce the optimal IDS
function distribution. In this research, we propose an IDS
solution that can be implemented in a distributed manner
where WMN routers independently choose the optimal set
of IDS function to perform. The distributed approach is
based on random IDS function selection by the nodes that
incur no communication overhead (caused by data exchanges
between nodes and the base station). It also no longer re-
quires a computationally powerful base station. We show
that random IDS function selection surprisingly achieves
near optimal network coverage ratios especially for high den-
sity WMN.
PRIDE uses a node-coverage approach, which means that
only nodes along each routing path participate in trac
monitoring. However, it is shown [10] that link-coverage can
achieve a higher link/path coverage ratio in infrastructure-
less wireless networks. Hence, in addition to the nodes lo-
cated on each routing path, other nodes can also participate
in trac monitoring if they can monitor at least one link of
that path. We use a link-coverage approach in our proposed
IDS and show how it increases the link/path coverage ratio.
3. SYSTEM AND SECURITY MODELS
System Model: The system we consider in this research
is similar to the one considered in PRIDE, as specied by
the IEEE 802.11s WLAN Mesh Standard [44]. The system
consists of: i) mesh access points (MAP) that connect WMN
clients (or \clients" for short) to the mesh network and ex-
ternal hosts (i.e., Internet); ii) a wireless mesh backbone con-
sisting of relay nodes, also known as mesh points (MP); and
iii) gateways, connecting the mesh network (internal hosts)
to the Internet (external hosts). Some WMN routers/nodes
(Note: from here on we use "node"and "router" interchange-
ably) are congured to work as both MP and MAP. Each
WMN node has two wireless interfaces providing mesh con-
nections on one interface and network access to the clients
on the other interface.
The WMN trac is either external, i.e., between clients
and external hosts, or internal, i.e., between two internal
hosts. We note here that a host inside the mesh is either a
client or a local server (e.g., a local FTP server) connected
to the mesh routers. Our system also requires the pres-
ence of a base station (for centralized approach) | a com-
putationally powerful node which periodically and securely
collects, via a middleware, information about mesh nodes:
processing/memory loads, trac information, etc. Based
on the collected information, the base station nds optimal
IDS functions to be assigned to each node and then securely
broadcasts [45] them to the nodes.
Attacker Model: We consider several types of attacks
in this article. An Insider attack is launched by either a
malicious client connected to a MAP or by a compromised
router. An Outsider attack is launched by either an exter-
nal host (connected to WMN through gateways) or by an
unauthorized client not connected to WMN. For example, a
malicious external host communicating with a mesh client
or a local server in our WMN can launch an outsider attack.
Furthermore, a malicious unauthorized wireless node physi-
cally located in the WMN coverage area, but not associated
to a WMN MAP, is also considered as an outsider attacker.
Depending on the attack type, i.e., insider or outsider, the
target can be either single-hop or multi-hop. For example,
a malicious client connected to a MAP attacking the MAP
or another host connected to that MAP is actually launch-
ing a single-hop attack. A compromised router attacking
one of its neighbors (a WMN router) is also an example of
a single-hop attack. The aforementioned single-hop attacks
are insider attacks. An unauthorized node (physically lo-
cated in WMN area) can launch a single-hop node-based at-
tack (targeting a WMN router or host) or a single-hop link-
based attack (targeting a communication link). A multi-hop
attack, however, is always against routers or hosts. In an
insider attack, a malicious client or a compromised router
can launch attacks against multi-hop routers/hosts in the
WMN. Moreover, outsider attacks performed by external
hosts always target multi-hop routers/hosts in the WMN.
Intrusion Detection Engine: Similar to PRIDE, the
IDS we consider in this article is Snort [21] because it is a
mainstream o-the-shelf IDS and experimentally observed [11]
to consume less resources than other IDS, e.g., Bro [20].
Moreover, unlike Bro, Snort is readily available for mesh
hardware, as part of the OpenWrt development tree [46],
i.e., a Linux distribution for embedded networking devices.
Snort can be congured for dierent levels of intrusion de-
tection. More complex actions performed by the detection
engine (e.g., number of active rule sets) require more mem-
ory [14]. We use the \ac-bnfa-nq" search method as it is
experimentally observed to consume minimum memory [14]
among all low memory search methods in Snort.
For eective detection of both single-hop and multi-hop
attacks, the intrusion detection system running on the mesh
router should inspect network trac at two dierent points:
the local (i.e., MAP) and upstream (i.e., MP) network inter-
faces. For instance, a single-hop attack from a local client
to another client in the same subnet (connected to the same
MAP) will go through the local interface, while a response
from a malicious external web site will go through both in-
terfaces. It is absolutely infeasible for resource-constrained
WMN hardware to run two Snort instances to monitor traf-
c on both interfaces. In addition, \interface bonding" pro-
posed for multi-interface conguration is not applicable to
mesh routers as it destroys routing congurations. Hence,
as it will be presented in more detail in Section 6, in our pro-
posed IDS, we develop a multi-interface Snort for OpenWrt
platform that monitors trac on multiple interfaces simul-
taneously. Our multi-interface Snort requires only 4% ad-
ditional memory load when compared to the original Snort.
IDS Function vs. Detection Module: PRIDE pro-
poses a modularization mechanism that groups small rule
les and splits large rule les, resulting in a few sets of Snort
detection rules of equal sizes (250 detection rules per each
set) called detection modules [14]. As presented in [27], the
entire set of Snort rule les (i.e., 70 les) and their corre-
sponding detection rules are put in either 6 or 12 modules.
This assignment trades o complexity of the IDS function
distribution problem with accuracy in memory load estima-
tion. In this article, we employ 6-module and 12-module
congurations, as dened in PRIDE, and their correspond-
ing memory loads. Thus, from here on, the terms\IDS func-




In this section, we formulate the optimal distribution of
IDS functions (detection modules) as an optimization prob-
lem. Although the problem formulation we present is based
on Snort terminology (similarly to PRIDE), it can be gener-
alized to other IDS, e.g., Bro or Di-Sec [47], with few minor
changes based on their internals and functionality. For ex-
ample, Di-Sec, a security framework proposed for resource-
constrained sensor networks, consists of several detection
and defense modules, similar to the Snort detection mod-
ules, and several sub-components that can be modeled as
Snort preprocessors.
4.1 Preliminaries
Given a wireless mesh network, we denote the number of
its nodes and number of its links by n and q, respectively.
We model the wireless mesh network as a graph G = fV;Eg,
where V is the set of mesh nodes (routers) fv1; v2;    ; vng,
and E is the set of backbone links fe1; e2;    ; eqg. An ex-
ample of such a graph, is shown in Figure 1 where V =
fv1; v2; :::; v10g and E = fe1; e2; :::; e16g. Figure 1, repre-
sents the network graph a real-world WMN deployed over
the oor of a building. We denote by matrixMqn the map-
ping between nodes and links, i.e., mij = 1 i node vj can
monitor link ei. Based on the link-coverage denition [10],
vj can monitor ei if ei is incident to vj or vj is connected
to the two end points of ei. The set of all links that can be
monitored by node vj is called Covering Set of node vj rep-
resented by CSj [10]. Accordingly, we denote by MSi the
set of all nodes that can monitor link ei, i.e., Monitoring Set


































































Figure 1: A WMN graph, consisting of 10 nodes
and 16 links. As shown, a 6-module conguration
is used in this WMN where Snort preprocessors are
also grouped in three sets of preprocessors [27]. The
nodes run dierent Snort congurations, e.g., node
v1 runs detection modules f1 and f4, which require
preprocessors c1, c2 and c3.
M1610 =
266666664
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
...
...   
...
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
377777775
:
We denote the set of all IDS functions (detection mod-
ules) by F = ffk j fk is a set of detection rulesg with size K
(i.e., jFj = K) where K = 6 in 6-module conguration and
K = 12 in 12-module conguration. We also denote the
set of IDS preprocessors (as in Snort) by C = fcr j9 fk 2
F that requires crg of size R (i.e., jCj = R) where R = 3 in
both 6-module and 12-module congurations. For the exam-
ple presented in Figure 1, F = ff1; f2; :::; f6g, i.e., 6-Module
conguration is used, and C = fc1; c2; and c3g. The depen-
dency between IDS functions and preprocessors is stored in
matrix DKR where dkr = 1 means that activation of mod-
ule fk requires the activation of preprocessor cr. For the
example shown in Figure 1, the matrix DT is as follows:
DT36 =
241 1 1 1 1 11 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1
35 :
Let w : fF ; Cg  ! [0; 1] be a cost function that assigns
memory load wfk and w
c
r to detection module fk and pre-




2 ;    ; wfK ] andW c = [wc1; wc2;    ; wcR] represent mem-
ory loads for the detection modules in F and for the prepro-
cessors in C, respectively. Considering the 6-module cong-
uration in PRIDE, for the conguration used in Figure 1,
W f = [13:3%; 14:6%; 13%; 17:4%; 14:6%; 17:3%] and W c =
[15:6%; 1:1%; 1%]. It is worth mentioning that wc1 = 15:6%
is the total load caused by Snort base line, stream5 (both
static and dynamic loads as explained in PRIDE), and frag3
- the most common and required Snort preprocessors for all
detection modules [27]. We denote by B = [b1; b2; :::; bn] the
base memory load (i.e., before performing IDS) of all nodes.
Finally, the maximum allowable memory load (after detec-
tion modules and preprocessors are loaded) is represented
by vector  = [1; 2;    ; n], (also called Memory Thresh-
old). Vector  depends on the memory space required by
active services in WMN, and it is typically set by the secu-
rity administrator.
4.2 Problem Formulation
The main objective of our proposed IDS is to monitor all
WMN links using the maximum allowable number of detec-
tion modules that can be performed on WMN nodes (i.e.,
activated and executed by Snort on nodes). A higher num-
ber of detection modules executed by node vj means more
attack trac can be detected on the links in CSj . Thus,
our IDS solution aims at assigning Snort detection modules
on the WMN nodes, such that all of WMN links are moni-
tored by the maximum number of modules and none of the
nodes is overloaded. In order to mathematically formulate
this problem, we rst introduce several denitions.
Definition 1. IDS Function Distribution,
represented by T = f(vj ;Fj ; Cj)j vj 2 V; Fj  F ; and Cj 
Cg, is a distribution of detection modules and preprocessors
in the WMN, such that modules Fj and their corresponding
preprocessors Cj are assigned to node vj (i.e., they will be
activated on the customized Snort executed on vj).
After the IDS Function Distribution, the set of detection
modules and preprocessors assigned to WMN nodes are rep-
resented by binary matrices XnK and ZnR, respectively.
Accordingly, xjk = 1 means module fk is activated on node
vj and zjr = 1 implies that preprocessor cr is activated on
node vj (i.e., there is at least one module assigned to node vj
that requires preprocessor cr). For example, the IDS Func-
tion Distribution, and matrices X and Z for the example
given in Figure 1 are:
T = f(v1; ff1; f4g; fc1; c2; c3g); (v2; ff4; f5g; fc1; c3g); :::
:::; (v10; ff2; f6g; fc1; c3g)g;
X106 =
266666664
1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 1
...
...   
...












The total memory load of node vj , after the IDS Function





viously, an IDS Function Distribution in which there is at
least one vj such that Lj > j is deemed infeasible because
the load Lj is not allowed to exceed the threshold j .
Definition 2. For a given link ei and its corresponding
monitoring set MSi, Link Coverage Ratio (LCR) is de-
ned as LCRi = jUij=K, where Ui = Svj2MSi Fj is the set
of detection modules assigned to nodes that can monitor the
link.
Definition 3. Link ei is called Fully Covered if LCRi =
1 (Ui = F), i.e., for 8fk 2 F ; 9 vj 2 MSi assigned with Fj
such that fk 2 Fj.
Definition 4. Link Coverage Problem (LCP)
Given G = fV;Eg, vectors W f and W c, and matrix D, nd
a distribution T = f(vj ;Fj ; Cj)j vj 2 V and Fj  Fand Cj 
Cg, such that 1
q
P
ei2E LCRi is maximized and Lj  j,8vj 2 V .
LCP aims at maximizing the average link coverage ratio
while ensuring that memory loads on nodes are below their
memory thresholds.
Given matrices M and X, we denote by matrix Y = M X
the mapping between links and the modules activated on the
monitoring set of the links, i.e., yik is in the range [0; n]. For
example, yik = 0 means that module k is not activated on
any of nodes in MSi while yik > 0 implies that there is at
least one node in MSi running module k. According to the
LCR (union of all Fj for 8vj 2 MSi), yik > 0 is equivalent
to yik = 1 since both of them mean link ei is monitored
by detection module fk (redundant modules do not count).
Thus, we dene function BN : fYg  ! f0; 1g that converts
yik to a binary value, i.e., if yik = 0, BN(yik) = 0, otherwise
BN(yik) = 1. For the example shown in Figure 1, matrices
Y166 and BN(Y166) are as follows:
Y166 =
266666664
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 2 1
1 1 1 0 1 1
...
...   
...





1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 1
...
...   
...
1 1 1 1 0 1
377777775
:
The objective function of LCP is non-linear. This is be-
cause the link-coverage requires the non-linear function BN.
Thus, unlike PRIDE, LCP cannot be formulated as an ILP.
In addition to non-linearity, LCP is more complex than path
coverage problem (as dened in PRIDE) for a given network.
This is because the number of paths to be covered is usually
less than the number of communication links in WMN [14].
Moreover, as mentioned in Section 2.2, we aim for a scalable
IDS solution that can be applied to large WMN (i.e., more
links have to be monitored). Thus, we need to develop a
technique to reduce the complexity of link coverage problem
when compared to path coverage problem.
One can observe that matrix D, for both 6-module and 12-
module congurations [27], can be summarized as: i) every
detection module requires the rst group of preprocessors
of size 15.6%; ii) every detection module requires either the
second group of preprocessors (1.1% load) or the third group
of preprocessors (1% load). We propose a dependency relax-
ation to run all three groups of preprocessors on every single
node at the price of at most 1.1% extra load. Accordingly,
the total memory load of node vj , after the IDS Function
Distribution, becomes Lj = bj + 17:7% + fk2Fjw
f
k . How-
ever, it reduces the complexity of LCP when compared to
path coverage problem in PRIDE.
Thus, LCP can be formulated as a non-linear optimization




(1T  BN(M  X)  1) (1)
subject to: BT + (17:7)1T + X W fT  T (2)
xjk 2 f0; 1g ;8j; k (3)
100100 000110 101000 010001
 v1  v2  v3  v10
K bits
Figure 2: The matrix X for the 10-node mesh net-
work shown in Figure 1 is encoded as a chromosome.
where the objective function is to maximize the average link
coverage ratio in the network; constraint 2 limits the mem-
ory load on every node vj to be less than its memory thresh-
old j ; and constraint 3 forces xjk to be either 1 or 0 meaning
node vj is either running module fk or not.
5. RAPID PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose RAPID, a protocol to solve
LCP in centralized and distributed manners. The central-
ized approach requires a base station that periodically col-
lects nodes' information (e.g., network connectivity and mem-
ory utilization), solves LCP, and nally broadcasts IDS func-
tion distributions to the nodes. The distributed solution
does not need the base station (i.e., nodes locally decide
which detection modules they should run).
5.1 Centralized Solution
Given a modularization chosen by the security administra-
tor for the IDS conguration (e.g., the 12-module congura-
tion imposes higher execution time to the solver but is suit-
able for low memory thresholds [14]), the centralized RAPID
periodically collects the local information from nodes, de-
cides on an optimal set of detection modules to be executed
by each node, and distributes them to the nodes. Since LCP
has a non-linear objective function, linear constraints, and
integer variables, we cannot use integer linear programming.
Thus, we propose a Genetic Algorithm (GA), a popular and
eective type of evolutionary algorithms.
GA starts with a set of random solutions and then derives
better solutions using the Darwinian process of \survival of
the ttest." The survival of the ttest process is iterative,
and uses genetic operations, such as Selection, Crossover,
and Mutation on the current set of solutions (from here on
we will use \set of solutions" and \population" interchange-
ably). Selection gives the most t solutions the chance to
survive. Crossover combines solutions in each generation to
produce osprings (i.e., new solutions) of the next genera-
tion, and mutation is used to maintain genetic diversity in
two consecutive generations. GA solutions are encoded as
bitstrings (i.e., chromosomes) of specic length and tested
for tness. In our formulation, matrix X is a solution that
can be encoded as a chromosome of length nK. Figure 2
depicts the chromosome corresponding to the IDS function
distribution (i.e., the solution represented by matrix X) of
the WMN shown in Figure 1. The tness (objective) value
of each solution is the average LCR in the network. The ge-
netic operations used in this article are based on operations
explained in [39] that their details are omitted here.
The centralized RAPID protocol is presented in Algo-
rithm 1 as performed on the base station. Given the set of
WMN nodes, the base station rst collects information from
nodes and then produces matrix M (Lines 1 and 2). More-
over, matrix X, number of initial solutions (POP SIZE) and
number of generations (GEN SIZE) are initialized in Line 2.
Next, the base station generates a set of POP SIZE random
Algorithm 1 Centralized RAPID
1: Data Collection(V;E; n; q)
2: Initialization(M;X; POP SIZE;GEN SIZE)
3: Initial Solutions(POP SIZE; SX)
4: g = 1
5: while g  GEN SIZE do
6: Elitism(POP SIZE; SX)
7: Selection(POP SIZE; SX)
8: Crossover(POP SIZE; SX)
9: Mutation(POP SIZE; SX)





15: X = Best Sol(SX)
16: Sec BRDCST (X)
solutions called SX (Line 3). Starting from the rst popula-
tion, the Algorithm then iteratively performs genetic opera-
tions and creates another population for the next generation
(Lines 4-9). The Algorithm stops generating a new popula-
tion if either the number of generations exceeds GEN SIZE
(Line 5) or the stopping criteria holds (Lines 10-12), i.e.,
no improvement in the recent  optimal values has been
observed, where  is set by the network administrator. Al-
gorithm 1 then extracts matrix X from the best solution in
SX of last generation (Line 15) and securely broadcasts the
IDS functions to the WMN nodes (Line 16).
5.2 Distributed Approach
The main purpose of a distributed approach for RAPID is
to remove the communication overhead caused by message
exchange between nodes/base station and the computation
overhead of running GA for large networks. Additionally,
this approach is adaptive to frequent path and topology
changes where the base station might not have the most
recent routing information (unless the nodes' information
is collected frequently, which might incur very high com-
munication and computation overhead). Hence, in the dis-
tributed RAPID (presented in Algorithm 2), each node, de-
pending on its memory threshold, chooses a set of random
detection modules to perform.
As shown in Algorithm 2, Line 1, each node requires some
preliminary information such as the set of modules and their
corresponding memory weights, set of preprocessors, and
memory threshold  which are assumed to be already set
on the device by the security administrator. The base mem-
ory load b is obtained from system logs (Line 1) and added to
the total memory load imposed by all preprocessors (Line 2).
The algorithm then creates a new set of detection modules
in a random order denoted by F 0 in Line 3. Next, detection
modules in F 0 are iteratively checked (Lines 4-6) if they can
be activated on the Snort conguration (depending on their
memory weight and threshold ). If so, the module will
be activated and the total memory load L will be updated
(Lines 7-8).
We will show that this approach works very well (produces
near optimal solutions) and its performance surprisingly in-
creases (i.e., achieves the centralized performance) in high
memory thresholds or high network density. It is worth em-
phasizing that such a good performance is achieved without
Algorithm 2 Distributed RAPID
1: Mod Setting(F ; C;K;R;W f ;W c; b; )









3: Rand Perm(F 0;F)
4: for f = 1 to K do
5: Mod = F 0(f)
6: if L+ wfMod   then
7: Activate(F ;Mod)
8: L = L+ wfMod
9: end if
10: end for
any communication overhead and with a very simple algo-
rithm when compared to the centralized RAPID.
6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we rst demonstrate, through a proof of
concept experiment using WMN hardware, that the ideas of
link-coverage and multi-interface Snort are practical. Next,
through extensive simulations, based on real data obtained
from real-world WMN deployment and memory measure-
ments, we evaluate the performance of our proposed cen-
tralized and distributed RAPID solutions. The main reason
we use simulation is to be able to evaluate RAPID's per-
formance for large networks and for dierent network den-
sities, which are extremely dicult to be evaluated in a real
testbed.
6.1 Proof of Concept Experiment
This section shows that link-coverage approach practically
works in WMN. It also evaluates the performance of multi-
interface Snort (as discussed in Section 3) and its extra mem-
ory load, when compared to the original Snort.
6.1.1 Multi-interface Snort
A common way for running Snort and other similar pas-
sive network monitoring applications on multiple network
interfaces is to bridge all interfaces into a single virtual net-
work interface (a process also known as \bonding"), and run
a single instance of the IDS on that virtual interface. On a
mesh router, however, this solution is not possible because
in Linux the bonded interfaces cannot be congured with
routable IP addresses, and consequently the router cannot
perform its main task of routing packets. Another option
would be to run two Snort instances, one for each inter-
face. Snort includes support for running multiple instances,
but due to its single-threaded design, each instance is a dif-
ferent process, with separate copies of all buers and data
structures. Although this approach works well for typical
multi-core IDS sensors with ample RAM, it is not practi-
cal for a mesh router with very limited CPU and memory
resources [14].
To be able to run a single Snort instance that receives
trac from both network interfaces without altering the
network conguration of each interface, we followed an al-
ternative approach and modied Snort to capture packets
concurrently through two Libpcap handles. This is possi-
ble by opening two Libpcap packet capture handles, one
for each interface, and then asynchronously retrieving pack-
ets from either handle through select(), whenever pack-
ets are available. A Libpcap handle can be put into \non-
blocking" mode using pcap_setnonblock(), and then a le
descriptor that can be monitored using select() can be ob-
tained through pcap_get_selectable_fd(). This design al-
lows us to: i) avoid the overhead of running a second Snort
instance (context switches, duplicate data structures); ii)
capture trac from both local and upstream network inter-
faces concurrently; and iii) preserve the routing congura-
tion of both interfaces. We experimentally observed that
our multi-interface Snort imposes only  4% extra memory
load (compared to the original Snort) when running on a
Netgear WNDR3700 router used in the PRIDE testbed.
6.1.2 Experimental Verification
We performed an experiment in a small-size indoor WMN
to validate link-coverage monitoring and multi-interface mon-
itoring. We note here that the idea of intrusion detection
using a set of detection modules distributed on multiple
WMN nodes was previously demonstrated and evaluated in
PRIDE.
In our experiment, we used three Netgear WNDR 3700
routers (e.g., nodes A, B, and C) connected to each other cre-
ating a triangle WMN topology. Each router was congured
to run a multi-interface Snort instance, monitoring network
trac on both 2.4 GHz (local trac among its clients) and
5 GHz (WMN backbone trac) wireless interfaces. Each
of routers A and B had one client, while two clients (lap-
tops) were connected to router C. Using the Rule to Attack
(R2A) tool [27], we launched two dierent types of attacks:
i) A's client targeting B's client (multi-hop attack); ii) a
C's client targeting another C's client (single-hop attack).
The corresponding detection modules for each attack were
activated on multi-interface Snort running on node C. The
alerts generated by the multi-interface Snort on router C
proved the detection of both single-hop and multi-hop at-
tacks simultaneously. Therefore, our proposed link-coverage
(i.e., monitoring WMN backbone trac on A-B link) and
multi-interface Snort (i.e., monitoring both local and up-
stream interfaces concurrently) was shown to be practical
for WMN.
6.2 Simulation Results
We performed a thorough set of simulations to evaluate
the performance of centralized and distributed RAPID in
covering WMN links and detecting dierent types of attack.
We compare our simulation results with PRIDE and moni-
toring node solutions as two state-of-the-art solutions. We
implemented a monitoring node solution (Mon. Sol.) based
on the formulation presented in [10]. The objective func-
tion, however, was changed to select nodes with higher total
memory so that more detection modules can be run on mon-
itoring nodes, thus having a fair comparison with RAPID.
All algorithms are implemented in MATLAB and run for
dierent network sizes and densities. More precisely, our
evaluation metrics are Average LCR inWMN, Average Mem-
ory Load on WMN nodes, and Average Intrusion Detection
Rates for dierent types of attack with respect to two tun-
ing parameters, Memory Threshold  and Network Density.
The average base line memory of the nodes (vector B) was
20%. Our simulation results are based on 6-module and
12-module congurations [27].
6.2.1 Average LCR and Memory Consumption















































Figure 3: The eect of  on the average link cover-














































Figure 4: The eect of  on the average memory
load in: (a) 6-Module conguration; (b) 12-Module
conguration.
we created 100 random networks of size 30 (Note: PRIDE
performance is evaluated on a 10-node WMN.) The average
LCR and its standard deviation obtained from centralized
RAPID, distributed RAPID and monitoring node solution
are depicted in Figure 3. Figure 3(a) shows the average
LCR for 6-module conguration while Figure 3(b) depicts
the average LCR for 12-module conguration.
As shown, the average LCR increases as  increases which
means more detection modules are executed on the nodes.
The monitoring solution (consistent to the results shown for
path coverage in [14]) has the minimum coverage ratio since
the selected monitoring nodes are resource-constrained and
cannot perform all detection modules and do not help each
other to achieve higher coverage ratios. Obviously, the av-
erage LCR in centralized RAPID is higher than that of dis-
tributed RAPID as the centralized approach uses global in-
formation and produces optimal IDS distribution. The dis-
tributed RAPID, however, achieves an almost similar LCR
to the centralized RAPID for large .
These results are comparable to the path coverage ratio
obtained for 2-hop paths in PRIDE [14]. We note here
that the execution time for the centralized RAPID is at
most  5 seconds (for 30-node WMN) while it was more
than 1 minute for the 10-node WMN in PRIDE (using ILP
solver) and more than 1 hour for 30-node WMN. Moreover,
when considering the average LCR, both centralized and dis-
tributed RAPID outperform PRIDE because RAPID uses
the link-coverage approach, which allows more nodes to par-
ticipate in trac monitoring. As expected, the average LCR
is slightly higher in 12-module conguration especially for
small . This is because the size of detection modules are
smaller than those in 6-module conguration, which allows
more modules to t in the small free memory spaces. It is
worth mentioning that such a better performance obtained
from 12-module conguration is at the price of slightly longer
execution time in RAPID, PRIDE, and Mon.Sol.
The average memory load on WMN nodes and its stan-
dard deviation of all three IDS solutions for the 6-module
and 12-module congurations are depicted in Figures 4(a)
and 4(b), respectively. It is important to note that the av-
erage memory load for the RAPID solution (both central-
ized and distributed) is always higher than that of moni-
toring node solution, i.e., consistent with results shown in
PRIDE. This is because in monitoring node solution, only
monitoring nodes are assigned with detection modules and
the non-monitoring nodes are not loaded with any detection
modules. Therefore, only few selected nodes will have high
memory load as opposed to RAPID where all WMN nodes
are loaded with the maximum number of detection mod-
ules that can t. The large standard deviation of average
memory load in Mon.Sol. indicates the dierence between
total memory load on monitoring nodes and non-monitoring
nodes.
6.2.2 Average Detection Rates for Different Attacks
As mentioned in Section 3, we consider both single-hop
(local) and multi-hop attacks in WMN. For a given WMN
of size n, we simulated 10 n single-hop attacks and 2 n
multi-hop attacks of random types (i.e., detectable by ran-
dom detection modules as listed in [27]) and measured the
detection rates based on the activated detection modules on
the nodes.
Figure 5 shows the average detection rate of all 10  n
single-hop attacks obtained from dierent IDS solutions.
The results are produced for 100 randomWMN of size n=30.
Figure 5(a) depicts the average detection rates of single-hop
attacks in all IDS solutions when the 6-module congura-
tion is used. As shown, the larger the , the higher the
detection rate is. This is because a larger memory threshold
allows nodes to load and execute more detection modules
and detect more local attacks, since the neighbors cannot
help the node in detecting local attacks. As depicted in
Figure 5(b), the average detection rate for 12-module con-
guration is slightly higher than those of 6-module cong-
uration in all three IDS solutions. It is worth mentioning
that, although the detection rates for both centralized and
distributed RAPID are at most  60%, they are much better
than for the monitoring node solution (i.e., at most  20%)
and for PRIDE (i.e., 0% for local attacks).
To evaluate the performance of IDS solutions in detecting
multi-hop attacks, we considered 100 random networks of
30 nodes and 60 random paths. The path length of each at-
tack is randomly chosen between 2 and 5 hops. Figures 6(a)
and 6(b) depict the average detection rates of multi-hop at-
tacks in all three solutions for 6-module conguration and
12-module conguration, respectively. As shown, the de-
tection rates for multi-hop attack in RAPID and Mon.Sol.
are much higher than those for single-hop attacks. This is
because as trac packets go through more IDS nodes, they
will be more likely inspected by more distinct detection mod-
ules. Moreover, as previously observed, the larger the , the
higher the detection rate will be. Also, the 12-module con-
guration again outperforms the 6-module conguration (at
the price of slightly larger time complexity).
Figures 7(a) and 7(b) show the simulation results for aver-













































Figure 5: The eect of  on the detection rate of
single-hop (local) attacks in: (a) 6-Module congu-













































Figure 6: The eect of  on the detection rate of
multi-hop attacks in: (a) 6-Module conguration;
(b) 12-Module conguration.
and 12-module congurations, respectively, in all IDS solu-
tions. The results are obtained from 100 random networks
of 30 nodes where 60 random attacks are considered for each
network. The compromised node is randomly chosen among
WMN nodes to run either a single-hop (targeting a neighbor
WMN node) or multi-hop attack. As shown, the results are
slightly worse than multi-hop attacks because the compro-
mised node itself is considered unable to detect the attack,
which results in inspecting attack trac with less detection
modules.
The last type of attack we consider for intrusion detection
evaluation is unauthorized client attack. An unauthorized
client is assumed to be physically located in WMN area but
not associated with any of MAPs (i.e., outsider). The at-
tacker can launch attacks against WMN nodes (e.g., DoS,
battery depletion, spoofed de-authentication, etc.) or WMN
links (e.g., jamming, blackhole/grayhole, etc.). We assume
that in the attack against a WMN node, the target is un-
able to participate in the intrusion detection process. Fig-
ures 8(a) and 8(b) show the average detection rate of unau-
thorized client attacks targeting WMN nodes for 6-module
and 12-module congurations, respectively. The results are
obtained from 100 random networks of 30 nodes where 300
random attacker locations and targets are considered. The
results show that these attacks are highly detectable by
RAPID algorithms as opposed to Mon.Sol. solution that can
achieve at most  60% detection rate. We note here that
PRIDE cannot detect such attacks since the attack trac
is not routed through WMN nodes. Figures 8(c) and 8(d)
show the average detection rate of unauthorized client at-
tacks targeting WMN links, when using 6-module and 12-
module congurations, respectively. As depicted, the results

























































































Figure 8: The eect of  on the detection rate of unauthorized client (outsider) attacks: (a) against nodes
in 6-Module conguration; (b) against nodes in 12-Module conguration; (c) against links in 6-Module





























































































Figure 9: The eect of  and network density on the average link coverage in: (a) 6-Module conguration
of distributed RAPID; (b) 12-Module conguration of distributed RAPID; (c) 6-Module conguration of













































Figure 7: The eect of  on the detection rate of
compromised node attacks in: (a) 6-Module cong-
uration; (b) 12-Module conguration.
more nodes participate in monitoring the target WMN link.
6.2.3 The Effect of Network Density on RAPID Per-
formance
In order to show the eect of network density on perfor-
mance of RAPID, we repeated all previous simulations (i.e.,
network density was 8 nodes per radio range) for two more
network densities, 4 and 13 nodes per radio range. Intu-
itively, the higher the network density should result in par-
ticipating more neighbors in trac monitoring that would
increase the average link coverage ratio and consequently the
intrusion detection rate. In this section, we show the simu-
lation results for average LCR and average detection rates
of dierent attacks as functions of  and network density.
Figures 9(a) and 9(b) show the average LCR obtained
from distributed RAPID for 6-module and 12-modules con-
gurations, respectively. The results conrm that the av-
erage LCR increases as or network density increase. Fig-
ures 9(c) and 9(d) depict the average LCR obtained from
centralized RAPID for 6-module and 12-modules congu-
rations, respectively. The results obtained from central-
ized RAPID are better than those obtained from distributed
RAPID, at the price of some communication and compu-
tation overheads. We note here that the network density
has no eect on the average LCR of PRIDE (because of
using node-coverage instead of link-coverage approach) and
Mon.Sol (because it only aects the number of monitoring
nodes and not the number of detection modules they per-
form).
Figures 10(a) and 10(b) show the eect of  and network
density on the detection rate of multi-hop attacks in the
distributed RAPID for 6-module and 12-modules congura-
tions, respectively. Surprisingly, the multi-hop attacks are
almost always detectable for   70% and network density
larger than 8 nodes per radio range in both 6-and-12-module
congurations. Figures 10(c) and 10(d) show the results for
the centralized RAPID which are above 90% even for the
lowest network density and memory threshold. We note here
that network density has no eect on single-hop attack de-
tection as only one node (the local router) is responsible for
intrusion detection and other WMN nodes do not partici-
pate in the intrusion detection process.
Figures 11(a) and 11(b) show the eect of  and network
density on the detection rate of compromised node attacks
in the distributed RAPID for 6-module and 12-modules con-
gurations, respectively. As depicted, the detection rate
increases as network density and  increase which means
more nodes with more detection modules inspect the attack
trac generated by the compromised nodes. Figures 11(c)
and 11(d) show the same results for the centralized RAPID

























































































Figure 10: The eect of  and network density on the detection rate of multi-hop attacks in: (a) 6-Module
conguration of distributed RAPID; (b) 12-Module conguration of distributed RAPID; (c) 6-Module con-

























































































Figure 11: The eect of  and network density on the detection rate of compromised node attacks in:
(a) 6-Module conguration of distributed RAPID; (b) 12-Module conguration of distributed RAPID; (c)
6-Module conguration of centralized RAPID; (d) 12-Module conguration of centralized RAPID.
tively. The results show that centralized RAPID outper-
forms distributed RAPID, however, at the price of higher
computation and communication overheads.
The eect of  and network density on the detection rate
of unauthorized client (outsider) attacks against WMN nodes
in the distributed RAPID are shown in Figures 12(a) and 12(b)
for 6-module and 12-modules congurations, respectively.
Also, Figures 12(c) and 12(d) show the same results for the
centralized RAPID when using 6-module and 12-modules
congurations, respectively. The results conrm that the
larger the  and network density, the higher the detection
rate will be. Moreover, centralized approach works better
than distributed approach as 12-module conguration also
works better than 6 module conguration.
Finally, we show the eect of  and network density on
the detection rate of unauthorized client (outsider) attacks
against WMN links in both distributed and centralized RAPID.
Figures 13(a) and 13(b) show the detection rates in the dis-
tributed RAPID for 6-module and 12-module congurations,
respectively. The results are slightly better than those ob-
tained from attacks against WMN nodes since more nodes
participate in trac monitoring. Figures 13(c) and 13(d)
show the same results for centralized RAPID when using
6-module and 12-module congurations, respectively.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we showed that trac-aware IDS solu-
tions proposed for resource-constrained WMN are based on
a strong assumption that might not hold for some WMN ap-
plications. We then investigated the scalability of state-of-
the-art trac-aware IDS solutions proposed for WMN and
showed that their communication and computation over-
heads make them impractical for large scale WMN. Next,
inspired by trac-aware solutions and their limitations, we
proposed a trac-agnostic intrusion detection mechanism
for resource-constrained WMN that is scalable and can be
implemented in both centralized and distributed manners
with lower computation and communication loads than trac-
aware solutions. Our proposed solution is based on a link-
coverage approach in trac monitoring and, unlike trac-
aware solutions that only detect multi-hop attacks, can de-
tect both multi-hop and single-hop attacks. Through real-
world experiments and extensive simulations, we showed
that our IDS solution outperforms state-of-the-art IDS so-
lutions proposed for resource-constrained WMN.
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Figure 12: The eect of  and network density on the detection rate of unauthorized client (outsider)
attacks against nodes in: (a) 6-Module conguration of distributed approach; (b) 12-Module conguration


























































































Figure 13: The eect of  and network density on the detection rate of unauthorized client (outsider)
attacks against links in: (a) 6-Module conguration of distributed approach; (b) 12-Module conguration
of distributed approach; (c) 6-Module conguration of centralized approach; (d) 12-Module conguration of
centralized approach.
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